Mechanism Design (ESEM)

ESEM
Presenter(s) Type Length Chair Room Number Add to calendar
Deniz Kattwinkel Satoshi Fukuda Qianjun Lyu Jeffrey Mensch Contributed Sessions 25/08 16:00 CEST
90
mins
Jeffrey Mensch
N26
Add to Calendar 2022-08-25 16:00:00 2022-08-25 17:30:00 EEA-ESEM 2022: Mechanism Design (ESEM). Room: N26 EEA-ESEM 2022 congress@eeassoc.org Europe/Rome public

Papers

(Listed in order of presenters above)

Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents

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Who to Listen to?: A Model of Endogenous Delegation

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Optimal Refund Mechanism

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Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning

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Presentations

Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents

Who to Listen to?: A Model of Endogenous Delegation

Optimal Refund Mechanism

Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning